1. The Group of Governmental Experts needs to thoroughly study the progress achieved and challenges encountered in the field of verification, and presents its views on the principles of verification. In addition to non-proliferation issues, attention of the GGE should also be focused on arms control and disarmament matters. The future priority of the international community in the field of verification is to improve and strengthen the existing multilateral verification regimes. Views and recommendations in this regard should also be an important part of the GGE's report.

2. Verification is mainly aimed at providing credible evidence for compliance assessment, maintaining deterrence to promote earnest compliance with relevant treaties and agreements, enhancing confidence among States Parties to relevant treaties and agreements, maintaining the effectiveness and authority of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, so as to promote international peace and security. Verification should be impartial and fair. It should contribute to promoting the common and universal security, rather than being abusively used in activities contradicting the purposes and principles of the treaties and agreements concerned.

3. Many important elements of the guiding principles of verification put forward by SSOD I and UNDC are still valid and applicable to date and deserve further enrichment and improvement. Verification activities should be in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and basic principles of the international law. The adequacy and effectiveness of relevant verification measures should be determined in the context of the treaty or agreement concerned. Verification measures should be feasible and cost-effective, instead of bringing too much burden for the States Parties. Effective measures are needed to prevent and rectify abuse or misuse of verification means. Any verification arrangements should be non-discriminatory and such arrangements should not interfere in the internal affairs of States concerned or undermine their economic, technological and social development.

4. Verification measures should be crafted strictly in accordance with the purposes, scope and nature of certain treaty or agreement, taking into full consideration features of the weapon systems concerned. Any new verification techniques, means and procedures should be feasible and receive universal support from the international community. Challenge inspection is an important means of verification. However, due to its highly intrusive and confrontational nature, such inspection can only be conducted with great caution and as the last resort.

5. Verification and compliance are closely linked. Verification is an important means to ensure earnest compliance with arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. However, it does not have the function to make compliance judgment by itself. Compliance judgment should be made by the decision-making mechanism of relevant treaty bodies. Efforts should be made to resolve compliance concerns peacefully through dialogues, consultations and negotiations.

6. Verification concepts need to be updated and developed in light of the change of situations in the field of arms control and non-proliferation. However, basic principles of verification, which have been universally accepted by the international community and tested by practices, should not be abandoned. The important roles of existing multilateral verification mechanisms, such as IAEA and OPCW, should be strengthened, rather than undermined or replaced.

7. The United Nations can play important roles in verification, including facilitating, coordinating and serving existing multilateral mechanisms; carrying out studies on evolution and development of verification concepts, basic principles, rules, guidelines and verification techniques in light of new circumstances; promoting public awareness, training and educational activities of multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties to enhance national capacities in the aspect of compliance and verification; rectifying abuse or misuse of verification. In playing its roles in the field of verification, the United Nations should cooperate and coordinate with existing multilateral verification regimes, and refrain from duplicating or undermining the work of the above regimes.

8. UNSCOM and UNMOVIC are monitoring and verification mechanisms established under certain historical situations and targeted at specific country. It is improper to apply these special arrangements in other situations indiscriminately as a model. The experience of existing multilateral verification mechanisms, such as IAEA and OPCW is of broader significance and deserves careful review.

9. In the long run, if consensus emerges, the establishment of a multilateral verification mechanism within the framework of the UN might be one of the goals of the international efforts. However, the following points should be duly considered:

First, pending the establishment of such a mechanism, the international efforts should focus on enhancing the universality and effectiveness of existing multilateral mechanisms.

Second, such a mechanism can only be established through negotiations with universal participation of all States.

Third, once established, such a mechanism should not replace, undermine or duplicate the work of existing regimes, such as IAEA and OPCW.

Forth, the verification methods adopted by such a mechanism should be effective and feasible, without imposing extra economic burden on UN member States.

10. In order to enhance capabilities of States in the aspect of compliance and verification, the international community should attach great importance to providing technical and financial assistance to the countries concerned, and promote exchange and cooperation among States with respect to compliance and verification.