On December 6, 2021, Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Foreign Ministry FU Cong attended the EU Non-proliferation and Disarmament Conference via video link and participated in the discussion on Trust and Credibility in Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament under the P5 Context. The full text of Director-General FU's remarks is as follows:

Thank you, Marjolijn. It’s a pleasure to attend the seminar on-line. I also thank Philippe and Under Secretary Jenkins for their presentations.

On the subject of their session, namely, Trust and Credibility in Arms Control, Non-proliferation and Disarmament, I wish to make the following points.

First, to promote trust and credibility, we should safeguard the authority and integrity of the international arms control regime.

--The willful withdrawal from international arms control and non-proliferation treaties and agreements by the Trump Administration has done lasting harm not only to the credibility of the US itself, but also to other countries’ trust in international regimes. This mistake should not be repeated. Further more, it is incumbent upon the current US administration to take active measures to repair the damage that is already done, and restore the trust that has been eroded.

--We welcome the extension of the New START by Russia and the US, and the resumption of the arms control talks between the two countries. We hope the two countries can agree on deeper cuts into their respective nuclear arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

--We deplore the establishment of Aukus and the cooperation among the US, UK and Australia on the construction of nuclear-powered submarines. This trilateral cooperation undermines regional peace and stability and constitutes grave risks of nuclear proliferation in contravention of the object and purpose of the NPT. This cooperation involves the transfer of weapon-grade HEU, and cannot be effectively safeguarded under the current IAEA safeguards system. Therefore there is no guarantee that the nuclear material thus transferred will not be diverted by Australia to the production of nuclear weapons. If allowed to go ahead unchecked, this cooperation will set a very bad precedent, which could be followed by other non-nuclear-weapon states. This may very well lead to the total collapse of the NPT regime. This event also lay bare the double standard of these three countries on non-proliferation, and will have far-reaching implications for the Iran nuclear issue and the de-nuclearization of the Korean Pennisula.

Secondly, we should promote strategic trust among the major powers.

--We should not allow our relationships to be defined by competition or even conflict. The world should not be divided into two different camps along ideological lines like in the Cold War era.

--In the nuclear field, the P5 should collectively reiterate that “A nuclear war cannot be won and should not fought.” The ongoing dialogues among the P5 on nuclear doctrines and nuclear risk reduction have been proven useful in promoting mutual understanding and trust, and should be continued. China has also proposed that these dialogues be institutionalized and expanded in scope to include all issues that bear on strategic stability among the P5, i.e., in addition to nuclear issues, we could also add onto the agenda issues like missile defence, outer space, cyber security and AI.

--The nuclear weapon states should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines. For that purpose, short of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which does not seem possible under the prevailing geopolitical circumstances, I can see no better policy option than the unconditional commitment to no-first-use, unilateral, mutual or multilateral.

--In this connection, we will be interested to see the outcome of the nuclear posture review of the Biden Administration, especially on the “sole purpose” issue. We hope that President Biden can turn his campaign promise into governmnet policy.

--Here, I would like to express our concern about the position and role of some non-nuclear-weapon states. As reported by the press, countries such as Japan, Australia and Germany are actively working on the Biden Administration against the adoption of the no-first-use policy. This speaks volumes about the policies of these countries on nuclear issues. These countries are the same countries that advocate reducing the role of nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of a nuclear war. Some senior figures in these countries argue that the US adoption of the no-first-use policy would mean the weakening of the US nuclear umbrella, and that would give them motivation to develop their own nuclear weapons. These are very dangerous remarks. It should ring an alarm bell in our minds about these countries’ nuclear capabilities and policies. And furthermore, if this line of argument is allowed to stand, what right does the international community have to try to stop Iran and DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons?

Thirdly, we should actively promote peaceful uses in nuclear and other fields.

--Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction could not be sustainable without the active promotion of peaceful uses of technology. They are the two sides of the same coin and should be treated in a balanced manner. This is the rationale behind of the UNGA resolution proposed by China on the strengthening of international cooperation on peaceful uses.

--There is a negative tendency we should guard against in the area of peaceful use of technology, including in the nuclear field, namely, the misuse of the notion of national security as a pretext to exclude companies of targeted countries from the international market. This has happened in the IT industry. And it seems to be proliferating into the nuclear industry as well. This is totally unwarranted, and against the spirit of market economy.

Given the time restraint, I will not elaborate on that.