The Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter referred to as the “Convention”) is an important pillar of the global security governance system, and it has played an important role in maintaining international peace and security and promoting the peaceful use of science and technology in the field of chemistry.

Being a victim of chemical weapons, China has always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and resolutely opposed the proliferation of chemical weapons and their technologies. As a founding state party to the Convention, China firmly supports the objects and purposes of the Convention, earnestly fulfills its obligations, commits itself to maintaining the authority and effectiveness of the Convention, and makes positive contributions to promoting security governance in the chemical field.

In April 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward the Global Security Initiative (GSI), calling on countries to adapt to the profoundly changing international landscape in the spirit of solidarity, and address the complex and intertwined security challenges with a win-win mindset. Under the guidance of Initiative, China will continue to promote the solidarity and cooperation in the international community, overcome risks and challenges in the field of chemical weapons, eliminate political confrontation, and enhance the continuous, comprehensive and effective implementation of the Convention.  

The progress of China’s implementation of the Convention and its relevant positions are reported hereby to the Fifth Review Conference as follows:

1. Legislative system and system of organization and management for the implementation

According to the provisions of the Convention and as per the Chinese national circumstances, the Chinese government has continuously improved the country’s legislative system and the system of organization and management for the implementation of the Convention.

(1) Legislative system. Since the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the decision on ratifying the Convention in 1996, China has promulgated, implemented and revised a series of laws and regulations, including the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Administration of Chemicals Subjected to Supervision and Control (revised in 2011), the Detailed Rules for Implementation of the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Administration of Chemicals Subjected to Supervision and Control (revised in 2018), the List of Monitored Chemicals (revised in 2020), etc. China has strictly managed and supervised the production, operation, use, storage and import and export of the scheduled chemicals, and cracked down on the illegal activities involved in accordance with the law. In 2022, China also revised the Control List of Measures for Export Control of Relevant Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies, and improved further the export control of the non-scheduled dual-use chemicals, equipment and technologies. 

In 2020, China promulgated the Export Control Law, which stipulates clear-cut regulations on the export control system, control measures and international cooperation, thus further improving the export control regime. In addition, in 2001, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed the Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, criminalizing acts that endanger public safety, such as illegally manufacturing, transporting, storing or dispensing toxic substances, and stipulating corresponding criminal penalties. In the framework of the Anti-Terrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China, China prevents and combats all terrorist activities, including chemical terrorism, in accordance with the law.

(2) System of organization and management. China has established and perfected the working mechanism for the implementation of the Convention at the central and local levels. At the central government level, the inter-ministerial joint meeting on the implementation of the Convention consisting of 17 government administrations is responsible for studying important issues on national implementation, coordinating and addressing important matters concerning the implementation; providing suggestions on the formulation and revision of laws and regulations relating to the implementation; coordinating the reception of the OPCW inspections; and guiding the management of controlled chemicals across the country. At the local level, the governments of the relevant provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government have set up the bodies taking charge of and executing the implementation. And the regions with a developed chemical industry have also established city-level and county-level implementation agencies. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has set up the National Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Office which is responsible for daily organization and coordination in the regard. Administrations responsible for the implementation of the Convention at all levels vigorously implement the basic strategy of the law-based governance, issue administrative permits on the construction of the controlled chemical facilities, as well as the production, import and export of the controlled chemicals in accordance with the law. In addition, supervisions and monitoring are carried out in assisting the enterprises to strictly fulfill their obligations under the Convention.

 (3) According to the principle of “One country, Two systems” and the Basic Laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR), the Central Government has established patterns for the application of the Convention in the HKSAR and the MSAR, ensuring the full and effective implementation of the Convention in these two regions. The governments of the HKSAR and the MSAR have respectively formulated and promulgated regulations and administrative orders, conducted strict supervisions on the production and trade of scheduled chemicals, and submitted annual declaration to the OPCW through the central government on time.

2. Issue of the chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China

(1) Under the framework of the Convention, the issue of Japanese ACWs is the gravest issue left over by history. On the eve of their defeat in 1945, the Japanese invaders secretly buried or abandoned a huge number of chemical weapons in China. Up to now, Japanese ACWs have been found in more than 120 locations in 18 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government in China. They have been posing a great threat to the lives and property of the Chinese people and the safety of the ecological environment in China, while presenting a major challenge to the realization of the objectives and purposes of the Convention.

After the Convention had entered into force, China and Japan signed two memoranda on the destruction of Japanese ACWs, respectively in 1999 and 2012. China overcame great difficulties and agreed with Japan to have Japanese ACWs destroyed on the territory of China and to provide its appropriate cooperation to Japan. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up the Office for the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan, which is specifically responsible for the disposal of Japanese ACWs. The Chinese government has conducted a large number of internal investigations, and assisted the Japanese side in completing hundreds of on-site excavation, identification and recovery operations. At the same time, China has made great efforts for the safe storage, consolidated transportation, selection of destruction technologies, destruction site selection and facility construction in regard to Japanese ACWs.

(2) China submitted the initial declaration on Japanese ACWs in May 1997, and has submitted subsequent declarations timely ever since. As at April 2023, China has submitted a total of 59 declarations on Japanese ACWs.

The mobile destruction operations in Nanjing, Shijiazhuang and Wuhan have been completed. In 2014, the destruction operations in Haerbaling, Dunhua, Jilin were launched, and in 2019, the mobile destruction operation in Harbin was started. Affected by the pandemic of the COVID-19, the destruction operations at those two places were temporarily suspended. The destruction operation in Haerbaling resumed in 2021. And in 2022, additional destruction facilities came into operation and initiated their ammunition destruction. The Harbin mobile destruction operation also resumed in 2022.

As at March 31, 2023, a total of 65,903 items of Japanese ACWs were destroyed. From January 2018 to January 2023, China assisted Japan in excavating and recovering 29,358 Japanese ACWs at Haerbaling, and in destroying 12,705 of them. 27 investigations were conducted out of Haerbaling, and 6,631 Japanese ACWs were excavated and recovered as a result. 3,582 Japanese ACWs were destroyed in Harbin. At the request of Japan, China has kept in safe storage 32,300 Japanese ACWs, which await their destruction.

Since the outbreak of the pandemic, China has efficiently coordinated its prevention and control of the pandemic as well as the disposal of Japanese ACWs. It has drawn up science-based plans for the operations and the pandemic prevention and control, strengthened emergency response drills and daily prevention and control measures, and provided facilitation as much as possible to the Japanese personnel coming over to China in the areas of border entry, transfer, site access, home return and equipment transport. It has also coordinated the treatment of the infected Japanese staff, thus effectively ensuring the smooth conduct of operations and the health and safety of the Chinese and Japanese personnel. Since November 2022, China has continued to optimize and readjust its pandemic prevention and control measures, further meeting the needs of the Japanese ACWs operations.

(3) Since 2013, China and Japan have jointly invited the Director-General of the OPCW and the delegations from its Executive Council to visit the Japanese ACWs destruction facilities in China. So far, five such visits have been paid. In September 2022, Director-General Arias and an Executive Council delegation virtually visited China through video-conferencing for the first time. All parties involved emphasized that the destruction of Japanese ACWs should be completed as soon as possible, thus contributing to the creation of a “world free of CWs”. Ever since 2005, China, Japan and the Technical Secretariat have held 37 rounds of tripartite consultations on the disposal of Japanese ACWs, which have played an important role in monitoring the destruction process.

By April 2023, China received a total of 146 inspections by the OPCW on the Japanese ACW facilities and on-site operations. In order to overcome the impact of the pandemic, China received an inspection online in October 2022. And in April 2023, China received the first on-site inspection since the outbreak of the pandemic.

(4) All the previous sessions of the Review Conference, the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council reviewed the issue of ACWs, repeatedly emphasized the importance and urgency of fully completing the destruction, and laid down clear requirements on the timeframe for the destruction. China has submitted 53 progress reports on the destruction of Japanese ACWs to the EC. Due to insufficient attention and inputs from the Japanese side, the destruction has failed to be completed several times. With a constructive approach, China agreed with Japan on new destruction plans time and again, and submitted them to the 46th, 67th, and 84th sessions of the EC for consideration and approval (EC-46/DEC.4, EC-67/DEC.6, EC-46/DEC.6 and EC-84/2). In 2022, since Japan failed once again to complete the destruction by the specified deadline, China and Japan jointly worked out the plan for the destruction beyond 2022, and submitted it to the 101st EC session held in October of the same year and got approval by the EC(EC-101/DEC.2).

(5) China has submitted its Position Paper on the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in China to the Fifth Review Conference. The paper comprehensively elaborates its position on this issue, and urges Japan to take the concerns of China and the international community seriously, fulfill its political commitment and legal obligations, implement the new destruction plan in a comprehensive, complete and accurate manner, increase its inputs effectively, speed up the destruction process comprehensively, and completely and thoroughly eliminate the scourge legacy of Japanese ACWs as early as possible.

China is of the view that the Fifth Review Conference should take the following actions: Reviews the progress of the destruction of Japanese ACWs in a comprehensive way. Notes with concern that Japan had failed for the fourth time to complete its destruction plan within the deadline. Reaffirms the importance and urgency of destroying all Japanese ACWs in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and the relevant decisions of the Council. Calls on Japan to comprehensively, completely and accurately implement the new destruction plan, adopted by the Executive Council at its 101 Session, so as to complete the thorough destruction of ACWs at an early date. Emphasizes that Japan will continue to use its best efforts to collect, and promptly provide to China, information on Japanese ACWs, and cooperate proactively with China with a view to full-scale investigation and confirmation activities on traces of ACWs. Calls upon all parties to pay attention to the realistic threat of the water and soil contamination caused by Japanese ACWs, urges Japan to earnestly shoulder its responsibility and solve the above-mentioned problems properly, and authorizes the Scientific Advisory Board to study the issues. Reaffirms the importance of conducting visits and inspections to Japanese ACWs destruction facilities by the Council and the OPCW. Emphasizes that the OPCW should continue to ensure its resources inputs for the verification of the destruction of Japanese ACWs.

3. Declaration and Verification

China is the country with the largest chemical industry as well as the largest number of the declared chemical facilities. China has always earnestly fulfilled its obligations concerning declaration and verification.

(1) Submission of declarations. In the 26 years since the entry into force of the Convention, China has submitted all its Schedule 1, 2 and 3 and other chemical production facilities initial declarations and annual declarations on time. Since 2002, China has submitted its national protection programme every year. Up to April 2023, China submitted a total of 53 annual declarations on chemical facilities. In 2023, China submitted its annual past activity declarations for 2022 which includes a total of 1,450 plant sites, of which 1,390 plant sites reached the inspection threshold. They accounted for about 28% of the total number of the inspectable facilities of all the States Parties combined.

China’s National Authority has established the “OPCW data collection and declaration system”, which makes it possible to submit online real-time declarations and improve the efficiency and management of the declaration continuously.

(2) Reception of verification. By April 2023, China has received a total of 621 on-site inspections, including 475 Article VI inspections, ranking the first in the world. Since 2018, China has received 84 Article VI inspections. In June 2019, the OPCW paid a technical visit to the single small-scale facility of the Institute of Chemical Defence of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences.

The Chinese government and Chinese enterprises have overcome the difficulties caused by the high frequency and wide regional distribution of the inspections and made every effort to provide cooperation and convenience to the inspection teams. All the previous inspections have confirmed that China is strictly fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, and the inspection teams have spoken highly of China’s efforts.

After the outbreak of Covid-19, China coordinated the prevention and control of the pandemic and the fulfillment of its obligation for receiving the verification. In early 2022, China reached a temporary arrangement with the Technical Secretariat on the conduct of inspections under the circumstances of the pandemic. It received 14 Schedule 2 inspections and 1 Schedule 1 inspection in that year. Since the beginning of 2023, the inspections of all the categories have been fully restored to the pre-pandemic level.

(3) China has submitted its Position Paper on Industry Verification to the Fifth Review Conference, which emphasizes that the improvement and optimization of industrial verification measures should be based on the principle of not increasing the additional burden on the industry and aiming at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the inspections. Full consideration should also be given to the principle of ensuring geographical balance. And efforts should be made to strengthen the research on the development of science and technology, assess the risk of the facilities taking into considerations of the specific actual circumstance, and refine the relevant standards and guidelines for such aspects as the declarations as well as import and export declaration.

China hopes that the Review Conference will conduct a comprehensive review of the industrial verification mechanism, forge positive progress in optimizing inspection consultations, increase inspection efficiency, ensure a balanced geographical distribution of inspection resources, and authorize the Industry Cluster to conduct further discussions on tackling the backlog of inspection tasks and addressing such issues as the “tipping point” of the inspection of Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs).

4. Dealing with the hot spot issues involving chemical weapons

(1) China has always firmly opposed the research, development or use of chemical weapons by any country, any organization or any individual under any circumstances. It has always held an objective and impartial stance, and has been committed to promoting the resolution of the hot spot issues involving chemical weapons through political and diplomatic means. China has always firmly upheld the international system with the United Nations at its core, the international order based on international law, and the basic norms of international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. And China is of the position that the Convention represents the yardstick and the basis for resolving the hot spot issues involving chemical weapons, and that the right way is to address them in accordance with the Convention.

(2) On the issue of the Syrian chemical weapons. During the relevant discussions in the United Nations Security Council and the Conference of the States Parties and the Executive Council of the OPCW, China always insisted that dialogue was the only right way to solve the issue of the Syrian chemical weapons issue, and requested that comprehensive, objective and impartial investigations should be carried out according to the procedures stipulated by the Convention. On the basis of hard evidence, conclusion should be drawn which would be able to stand the test of facts and history, and the abuse of the issue by some states concerned for political manipulation should be firmly opposed. China believes that the establishment of the Investigation and Identification Team does not conform to the provisions of the Convention, that it does not reflect the principle of comprehensiveness, objectivity, and impartiality and that it will not be able to come to any conclusion that can stand the test of facts and history.

Based on its consistent position, China, together with 23 other States parties, voted against the decision on “Addressing the Threat Posed by Chemical Weapons Use” at the Fourth Special Session of the CSP in June 2018. At the 94th Session of the EC in July 2020 and the 25th Session of the CSP in April 2021, China voted against the decision on “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”. For five consecutive years since 2018, China has voted against the OPCW budget which includes the allocation of the financial resources for the attribution of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. China also voted against the resolutions of the UN General Assembly on “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons” and on “Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention”. China maintains that the handling of the alleged use of chemical weapons should be brought back into the framework of the Convention as soon as possible, and that the work in this regard should be carried out strictly in accordance with the Convention and its Verification Annex.

(3) In February 2023, China released “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”, which clearly opposes the research, development and use of biological and chemical weapons by any country under any circumstances. On such occasions as the UN Security Council and the Conference of the States Parties and the Executive Council of the OPCW, China has repeatedly stated its position on the situation in Ukraine and on the issues relating to chemical weapons, emphasizing that all parties should strictly abide by the Convention and avoid adding fuel to the fire and intensifying the situation. China has also encouraged the parties concerned to seek a proper solution to the relevant issues through dialogue and consultation within the framework of the Convention.

5. International cooperation on peaceful uses, assistance and protection against chemical weapons 

(1) The use of science and technology in the chemistry for peaceful purposes and international cooperation are the inalienable rights granted to States Parties by the Convention. At the previous sessions of the Review Conference, the Conferences of the States Parties and the Executive Council, China, together with the NAM CWC States Parties, repeatedly called for the strengthening of international cooperation on peaceful uses, and for the formulation of a plan of action for the implementation of Article XI of the Convention.

At the 10th, 12th and 14th Sessions of the CSP in 2005, 2007 and 2009, China and the NAM CWC States Parties jointly promoted the adoption of three decisions on the full implementation of Article XI (C-10/DEC.14, C-12/DEC.10 and C-14/DEC.11). In 2011, China and relevant States Parties promoted the further adoption, at the 16th session of the CSP, the decision on “Components of an Agreed Framework for the Full Implementation of Article 11” (C-16/DEC.10), which proposes specific measures for implementing Article XI. In 2007 and 2013, the NAM CWC States Parties and China submitted the two working papers of “Indicative Elements of a Plan of Action on the Full Implementation of the Article XI” (C-12/NAT.1) and “Proposal for a Plan of Action on the Full Implementation of the Article XI” (RC-3/NAT.8), which set out the basic elements for formulating an Article XI plan of action. At CSP and EC sessions, China and the NAM CWC States Parties made joint statements repeatedly, calling for practical actions to be taken to strengthen international cooperation on peaceful uses, and for drawing up a plan of action for the implementation of Article XI.

(2) In 2021 and 2022, the 76th and 77th Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly adopted the resolutions “Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security” submitted by China and other member states with a similar position. The resolutions underscore that the peaceful use of science and technology is crucial to sustainable development, and that international law grants countries the inalienable right to peaceful use of science and technology. It urges the states concerned to remove their undue restrictions on the developing countries, and encourages dialogue and cooperation on this subject. The resolutions reflect the shared position of the international community, especially of the developing countries. China will continue to press the full and effective implementation of the resolutions for the purpose of safeguarding the common interests of the international community, and China calls on all States Parties to support them and take an active part in the follow-up process.

The above-mentioned resolutions are in line with Article XI of the Convention, the relevant outcome documents of the Review Conference and the decisions concerned of the Conference of the States Parties. In particular, the resolutions welcome various initiatives aiming at promoting international cooperation on peaceful uses, including that of formulating a plan of action for the full implementation of Article XI. The comprehensive and effective implementation of the resolutions will help forge new consensus and inject new impetus into the implementation of Article XI.

(3) China has submitted its “Position Paper on Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses under the Framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention” to the Fifth Review Conference. This paper calls for the implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions of the UN General Assembly in combination with the planning for the implementation of Article XI, giving higher priority to peaceful uses and the developmental issues which the developing countries have been concerned about for a long time, and creating new ideas and new landscapes for the implementation of Article XI. China will continue to help advance the work in this respect.

(4) China has taken concrete actions to promote international cooperation on peaceful uses. Since China made commitment to provide personal protection, detection and decontamination equipment to the OPCW in 1999, it has built a dedicated assistance equipment storehouse, which is updated and managed regularly. Since the entry into force of the Convention, China and the OPCW have jointly held 8 training courses on assistance and protection against chemical weapons and 2 training courses on medical assistance. In 2018, an advanced training course on protection against chemical weapons was held in Beijing, through which 18 representatives from 15 countries, including Bahrain, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire and Cuba, were trained on protection against chemical weapons. In 2019, a training course on medicine protection against chemical weapons was held in Xi’an, in which 26 professional and technical personnel from 19 countries, including Argentina, Bangladesh, Greece and Kenya took part. In 2018 and 2019, China provided chemical enterprises for internships in the OPCW Associate Program, hosting each year 2 trainees for their internships in China.

China has actively supported the construction and operation of the Centre for Chemistry and Technology (ChemTech Center). In 2019, China donated US$30,000 to the OPCW for supporting the construction of the ChemTech Center. In 2023, China decided to allocate €50,000 from the balance of its donations to the OPCW for for the Fellowship Programme in the ChemTech Center, and, in addition, to co-host the Course for Analytical Chemists from Laboratories Supporting Customs Services in the centre.

6. Cooperation with the OPCW

China is the second largest budget contributor to the OPCW, with its share of the assessed contribution rising from 0.8% at the time of the entry into force of the Convention to 15.254% in 2023. From 2018 to 2022, China contributed more than €39 million to the regular budget of OPCW, thus providing the strongest guarantee for the normal operation of the Organization. China has also made an accumulative donation of nearly USD300,000 to the OPCW.

China has always actively supported the work of the Director-General and the Technical Secretariat. The successive DGs including the incumbent DG Mr. Arias have paid altogether 11 visits to China. The Chinese government has actively selected and recommended talented personnel to work in the Secretariat. It has also sent experts to join such working bodies as the Scientific Advisory Board, the Confidentiality Commission and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach and to attend expert meetings.

The Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry of China’s Research Institute of Chemical Defence and the Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis of China’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences have become OPCW’s designated laboratories. Since 1997, they have participated in the proficiency tests for environmental samples for the designated laboratories. In 2016, they began to participate in the proficiency tests for biomedical samples, and received good grades therefrom. The Chinese laboratories have also actively assisted the laboratories of other States Parties in capacity-building.