1.The trilateral cooperation among the US, the UK and Australia on nuclear-powered submarines undermines regional peace and stability, and constitutes serious risks of nuclear proliferation in contravention of the object and purpose of the NPT, and even disrupts the international nuclear non-proliferation system. China expresses its deep concern over and strong opposition to such cooperation. The trilateral cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines would be the first incident involving the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion reactors and weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) from nuclear-weapon States to a non-nuclear-weapon State. The naval nuclear propulsion reactors and their associated nuclear material to be transferred by the US and the UK to Australia cannot be effectively safeguarded under the current IAEA safeguards system. Therefore there is no guarantee that the nuclear material thus transferred will not be diverted to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

2. China notes the IAEA Director General’s statement on 14th March claiming “Foreign Minister Wong has formally requested the Agency to commence negotiations on an arrangement required under Article 14 of Australia’s CSA. An effective arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s CSA to enable the Agency to meet its technical safeguards objectives for Australia under the CSA and AP will be necessary.” 

3. The three countries and the IAEA have no authority to interprete Article 14 of CSA and its application. There’s a huge international divergence on the application of Article 14, which has never been applied before. The international community is still far from reaching consensus on the definition of “non-peaceful activities”& “non-proscribed military activity” as well as on the scope and procedure for non-application of safeguards. In history, the formation, modification, explanation and execution of all kinds of safeguards agreements, whether CSAs, APs or SQPs, are all negotiated and decided by all the IAEA member states, and approved by the Board of Governors. Thus the explanation of Article 14 of CSA can be no exception. In 1978, the then-Director General made it clear in his exchange of letters with the Australian side(GOV/INF/347) that the Board of Governors had taken no opportunities to explain Article 14 and relevant procedures because no parties of NPT seek for the application of it. This fully proves that it shall be the Board of Governors to interprete Article 14 and its application rather than the Secretariat of the IAEA.

4. It will set a bad precedent if Australia invokes Article 14 for non-application of safeguards. The trilateral cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines involves large quantities of weapon-grade HEU. If Australia seeks non-application of safeguards, new arrangements for non-nuclear-weapon State fulfilling safeguards obligation will be created. That means part of its nuclear activities will be under IAEA safeguards of the IAEA while large quantities of HEU will be out of safeguards. Such cooperation will open the “Pandora’s box” and other countries may follow suit, severely undermining the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and negatively impact the solution of regional nuclear hotspot issues.

5. The IAEA cannot implement effective supervision over the nuclear material inside the naval nuclear propulsion reactor. According to Article 14, the IAEA shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such nuclear materials, but shall not have any knowledge of military confidential information. Under such circumstances, Australia and the Secretariat of the IAEA cannot arrive at an effective safeguards arrangements accordingly. The IAEA also cannot implement effective supervision over the nuclear material inside the naval nuclear propulsion, and avoid the risks of nuclear proliferation. 

6. There is a contradiction between the Statute of the IAEA and the CSA. Article 2 of the Statute states, “It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”. However, Article 14 of CSA states that nuclear materials from “non-proscribed military activities” does not require the application of safeguards. Once the IAEA agrees to apply Article 14, it essentially means promoting military activities and therefore violates the Statute.

7. The trilateral cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines safeguard involves complex political, legal and technical questions, and has a direct bearing on the authority, integrity and effectiveness of the NPT, and thus is closely related to the interests of all IAEA member States. All the IAEA member states shall be allowed to discuss the issue through a transparent, open and inclusive intergovernmental process, and make decisions by consensus according to the historical practices of strengthening the safeguards system. The three countries shall not start nuclear-powered submarine cooperation before all parties reach consensus. The Secretariat of the IAEA shall not negotiate and conclude safeguards arrangements with the three countries arbitrarily.

8. China hopes that the trilateral cooperation on nuclear-powered submarine and its various aspects can be thoroughly discussed in this round of NPT review process by all parties. The Secretariat of Preparatory Committee and the Secretariat of the IAEA shall promote the intergovernmental process in a just, transparent and professional way according to their mandates, in order to improve and strengthen the safeguards system of the IAEA.